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INTRODUCTION 
When a litigant argues her case before an appellate court, she can 
benefit from the decision of the court in either (or both) of two ways.  
First, the litigant can benefit by emerging victorious in the specific 
case before the court.  The court can decide in favor of the litigant 
and grant her the specific relief she seeks.  Second, the court can rule 
in a way that provides useful precedent to the litigant for her future 
litigation.  This is possible even if the court decides not to grant the 
litigant the specific relief she requests.1 
Some court decisions are a clear win for one side.  Not only is that 
side the prevailing party in a given appeal, but the court’s opinion 
also provides helpful precedent for future cases.  Other decisions, 
from the day they are decided, may allow one party to emerge victo-
rious on the particular issue being appealed while simultaneously 
making it harder for that party to succeed in future cases.2  And some 
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 1 The above is applicable to a decision by any appellate court, but the effect is the most 
significant when the decision comes from the U.S. Supreme Court because its decisions 
cannot be appealed any further and are binding statements of federal law on all other 
courts. 
 2 E.g., Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., 523 U.S. 75 (1998) (finding that same-sex dis-
crimination is actionable under Title VII, but finding that the discrimination must be 
“because of sex,” and that there is less likely to be an inference that discrimination is mo-
tivated by a plaintiff’s sex when the parties are of the same sex); Mary Coombs, Title VII 
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cases appear to be clear wins for one side, only to be used against that 
side in subsequent cases.3  In this Comment, I will argue that the Su-
preme Court’s decision in Philip Morris USA v. Williams,4 in which the 
Court sided with a corporate defendant facing significant punitive 
damages liability,5 may fall into this third category. 
The Supreme Court’s decision in Philip Morris deals with the con-
stitutionality of a $79.5 million punitive damages verdict against Phi-
lip Morris, the maker of Marlboro brand cigarettes, for the death of 
Jesse D. Williams.6  At trial, the jury found that Philip Morris had neg-
ligently caused the death of Mr. Williams—a heavy smoker since the 
1950s, who died from lung cancer in 1997.7  Having found liability, 
the jury awarded the plaintiff $821,000 in compensatory damages.8  
But it did not stop there.  In addition to finding that Philip Morris 
had acted negligently, the jury found that Philip Morris had “engaged 
in deceit” by “knowingly and falsely [leading Mr. Williams] to believe” 
that it was safe to smoke so heavily,9 and based on this finding, the 
jury awarded the plaintiffs an additional punitive damages award of 
$79.5 million10—nearly one hundred times larger than the compensa-
tory damages award. 
 
and Homosexual Harassment After Oncale:  Was It a Victory?, 6 DUKE J. GENDER L. & POL’Y 
113, 144 (1999) (“[T]he extension of Title VII to same-sex sexual harassment may make 
the situation of gay and lesbian employees, as a whole, even worse.  It is unclear how 
much it will protect them from harassment by their heterosexual colleagues.  Yet, it may 
make it relatively easy for those same colleagues to successfully charge them with harass-
ment.” (footnote omitted)). 
 3 E.g., Parents Involved in Cmty. Schs. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 127 S. Ct. 2738, 2744 
(2007) (citing the principles of the Court’s Brown v. Board of Education decisions, 347 U.S. 
483 (1954) and 349 U.S. 294 (1955), to strike down voluntary integration programs in 
public schools); Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555 (1992) (applying the injury-
in-fact test, which liberalized the standing requirements in Association of Data Processing 
Service Organizations, Inc. v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150 (1970), to find that plaintiffs did not have 
standing to sue).  For a good analysis of the development of the injury-in-fact require-
ment from Data Processing to Lujan, see Cass R. Sunstein, What’s Standing After Lujan?  Of 
Citizen Suits, “Injuries,” and Article III, 91 MICH. L. REV. 163 (1992). 
 4 Philip Morris USA v. Williams, 127 S. Ct. 1057 (2007). 
 5 Philip Morris is the most recent step in the Court’s apparent attempt to reign in punitive 
damages awards through the use of due process review.  The Court previously struck 
down punitive damages awards for violating the Due Process Clause in State Farm Mutual 
Automobile Insurance Co. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408 (2003), and BMW of North America, Inc. v. 
Gore, 517 U.S. 559 (1996). 
 6 See Philip Morris, 127 S. Ct. at 1060–61. 
 7 See id. at 1061; Brief for the Petitioner at 2, id. (No. 07-1216). 
 8 See Philip Morris, 127 S. Ct. at 1061. 
 9 Id. 
 10 Id. 
  
Feb. 2009] LOSING THE PROCEDURAL BATTLE 731 
 
After the case made its way up through the Oregon courts,11 where 
the punitive damages judgment was ultimately sustained by the Ore-
gon Supreme Court,12 the U.S. Supreme Court granted certiorari to 
review the award to determine whether it was consistent with both 
substantive and procedural due process.13  On review, the Court held 
that, because the trial court had improperly rejected a jury instruc-
tion regarding the allowable use of evidence of harm to non-parties,14 
the $79.5 million punitive damages verdict against Philip Morris was 
reached in violation of Philip Morris’s procedural due process 
rights.15  In explaining the reasoning behind its holding,16 the Court 
stated that “the Due Process Clause requires States to provide assur-
ance that juries are not asking the wrong question, i.e., seeking, not 
simply to determine reprehensibility, but also to punish for harm 
caused strangers.”17  The Court then remanded the case to the Ore-
gon Supreme Court to apply the standard set forth in its ruling,18 al-
lowing Philip Morris to claim victory in the specific decision. 
 
 11 See id. at 1060–62 (describing the case’s procedural history in the Oregon court system). 
 12 Williams v. Philip Morris Inc. (Philip Morris V), 127 P.3d 1165, 1182 (Or. 2006), rev’d and 
remanded sub nom., Philip Morris, 127 S. Ct. 1057. 
 13 See Philip Morris USA v. Williams, 547 U.S. 1162 (2006) (granting certiorari to review the 
punitive damages judgment for violations of both substantive and procedural due proc-
ess); Petition for a Writ of Certiorari at I, Philip Morris, 127 S. Ct. 1057 (No. 05-1256), 
2006 WL 849860 [hereinafter Petition]. 
 14 See Philip Morris, 127 S. Ct. at 1064–65. 
 15 See id. at 1065. 
 16 Although the Court’s procedural holding may be viewed as an implicit extension of some 
of the language in State Farm, see 538 U.S. 408, 422 (2003) (“Lawful out-of-state con-
duct . . . must have a nexus to the specific harm suffered by the plaintiff.  A jury must be 
instructed, furthermore, that it may not use evidence of out-of-state conduct to punish a 
defendant for action that was lawful in the jurisdiction where it occurred.” (citation omit-
ted)), the Court believed it was a sufficiently novel holding to warrant further explana-
tion.  See Philip Morris, 127 S. Ct. at 1065 (“We did not previously hold explicitly that a jury 
may not punish for the harm caused others.  But we do so hold now.”). 
 17 Id. at 1064. 
 18 Id. at 1065.  The Court stated that “the application of this standard may lead to the need 
for a new trial, or a change in the level of the punitive damages award,” but did not spec-
ify exactly what the Oregon Supreme Court would have to do to comply with its ruling.  
Id.  On remand, the Oregon Supreme Court found that a new trial was unnecessary and 
upheld the jury verdict on other grounds.  See Williams v. Philip Morris Inc. (Philip Morris 
VII), 176 P.3d 1255, 1257 (Or. 2008).  The Supreme Court has granted certiorari to re-
view this decision in Philip Morris USA Inc. v. Williams, 128 S. Ct. 2904 (2008), and deter-
mine “[w]hether, after this Court has adjudicated the merits of a party’s federal claim 
and remanded the case to state court with instructions to ‘apply’ the correct constitu-
tional standard, the state court may interpose—for the first time in the litigation—a state-
law procedural bar that is neither firmly established nor regularly followed.”  Petition for 
a Writ of Certiorari at i, Philip Morris, No. 07-1216 (U.S. Mar. 24, 2008), 2008 WL 795148. 
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Despite the fact that Philip Morris was the victorious party on this 
particular appeal, the question of which party will benefit more from 
the decision in the long-run is harder to answer.  Most commentators 
have viewed Philip Morris as “a victory for corporate defendants,”19 a 
characterization that appears reasonable at first blush.  The Court’s 
decision explicitly imposes new procedural limitations on plaintiffs 
seeking punitive damages—that a jury may not use punitive damages 
to directly punish the defendant for harm caused to non-parties to 
the litigation, but it may consider such harm in determining a defen-
dant’s reprehensibility.20 
But I will argue that another aspect of the Philip Morris opinion—
an aspect that has received almost no scholarly attention—has the po-
tential to have a much more significant impact on future litigation, 
and may ultimately be detrimental to the interests of Philip Morris 
and other mass-tort defendants.  This aspect is the Court’s re-
conceptualization of “reprehensibility,” which is a key factor for the 
jury to examine when awarding punitive damages,21 as well as one of 
the three guideposts that reviewing courts use to determine whether 
an award violates substantive due process.22  The Court’s statements 
about reprehensibility suggest a very different conception of repre-
hensibility than what the Court had described in BMW of North Amer-
ica, Inc. v. Gore23 and State Farm Mutual Auto Insurance Co. v. Campbell.24  
If courts reviewing punitive damages awards in the future understand 
the Court’s language regarding reprehensibility as being applicable 
 
 19 Sachin Bansal, Comment, Philip Morris USA v. Williams:  A Confusing Distinction, 2 DUKE 
J. CONST. L. & PUB. POL’Y ONLINE EDITION 61, 75 (2007); see also The Supreme Court—
Leading Cases, 121 HARV. L. REV. 185, 277–78 (2007) (“Philip Morris is only the latest ex-
ample of how our society insists on providing ‘due process’ protections for wealth aggre-
gations while ignoring the widespread losses of life and constraints on liberty that plague 
so many people and communities.”); Linda Greenhouse, Justices Overturn $79.5 Million in 
Punitive Damages Against Philip Morris, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 21, 2007, at A14 (explaining that 
the decision was “a victory for the cigarette industry and for other corporate defendants 
whose products or behavior have caused widespread injury”). 
 20 See Philip Morris, 127 S. Ct. at 1065.  The Court explained that a plaintiff may still present 
evidence of harm to non-parties to the jury, but once it has done so, the trial court must 
“provide assurance that the jury will ask the right question, not the wrong one.”  Id. at 
1064. 
 21 See Philip Morris, 127 S. Ct. at 1064 (majority opinion) (“Philip Morris . . . does not deny 
that a plaintiff may show harm to others in order to demonstrate reprehensibility.  Nor 
do we.”). 
 22 See BMW of N. Am., Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 575 (1996) (noting that one of the most 
important factors in determining the reasonableness of a jury award is the degree of rep-
rehensibility of the defendant’s conduct). 
 23 517 U.S. 559. 
 24 538 U.S. 408 (2003). 
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to substantive due process review, then the Court’s opinion could 
have a significant impact on the way courts review punitive damages 
awards.25 
In Part I of this Comment, I will discuss how the Supreme Court 
conceptualized reprehensibility prior to its decision in Philip Morris.  I 
will argue that reprehensibility was based on factors that demon-
strated the culpability of the defendant and the callousness of the de-
fendant’s conduct.  The amount of harm was only a relevant consid-
eration if it was instrumental in demonstrating culpability or 
callousness.  In Part II, I will discuss how the Court’s language regard-
ing reprehensibility in Philip Morris differs dramatically from the un-
derstanding of reprehensibility previously expressed by the Court in 
Gore and State Farm.  It is broader than the Gore/State Farm under-
standing of reprehensibility in that it allows for the consideration of 
the amount of harm for its own sake, not just to show culpability.  I 
will also show how the manner in which the Court applies the proce-
dural holding of the case, as well as the Court’s analogy to an atypical 
recidivism case in connection with its view of reprehensibility, simi-
larly suggests a broader understanding of reprehensibility than the 
Court had previously expressed.  Finally, in Part III, I will discuss the 
differences between substantive due process and procedural due 
process review of punitive damages awards, and describe the ways in 
which the case law has treated the two areas as being coextensive.  I 
will argue that the Court’s discussion of reprehensibility in Philip Mor-
ris, although made in the procedural due process context, has the po-
tential to be extremely relevant to how courts view the reprehensibil-
ity factor in substantive due process cases as well.  Based on this 
discussion, and an explanation of how the lower courts have applied 
the three guideposts, I will explain how the change in the Court’s 
view of reprehensibility could significantly benefit plaintiffs suing 
corporate defendants in mass-tort lawsuits. 
I.  REPREHENSIBILITY PRIOR TO PHILIP MORRIS 
Prior to Philip Morris, the Supreme Court’s conception of repre-
hensibility as a factor relevant to punitive damages was best spelled 
out in the Court’s decisions in BMW of North America, Inc. v. Gore26 and 
 
 25 See discussion infra Part III.  Early signs of such an application of Philip Morris are starting 
to show up in decisions from both the Supreme Court and lower courts.  See infra notes 
100, 130, 132. 
 26 517 U.S. 559 (ruling in favor of BMW and striking down a $2 million punitive damages 
award). 
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State Farm Mutual Auto Insurance Co. v. Campbell.27  In both Gore and 
State Farm,28 the Court insisted that the reprehensibility of the defen-
dant’s conduct is “the most important indicium of the reasonableness 
of a punitive damages award,”29 and that it is the first guidepost for a 
court to consider when reviewing a punitive damages award.30  But 
while the Court was clear in proclaiming the importance of repre-
hensibility in determining the reasonableness of a punitive damages 
award, it was far less clear in its attempt to explain what particular as-
pects of conduct make that conduct reprehensible, and how a defen-
dant’s level of reprehensibility should be considered by a jury in im-
posing punitive damages and by a judge in reviewing such damages.  
By examining the Court’s decisions in Gore and State Farm, we can at-
tempt to divine a coherent theory of how the Court conceptualized 
reprehensibility prior to Philip Morris. 
In Gore, the Court adopted a set of guideposts by which punitive 
damages awards could be reviewed to determine whether a verdict is 
so excessive as to violate constitutional substantive due process.31  The 
three guideposts mentioned in Gore are “(1) the degree of reprehen-
sibility . . . ; (2) the disparity between the actual or potential harm 
suffered by the plaintiff and the punitive damages award; and (3) the 
difference between [this remedy] and the civil penalties authorized 
or imposed in comparable cases.”32 
Seven years later in State Farm, the Court further elaborated on 
how courts are to apply the guideposts in assessing punitive dam-
ages.33  In some ways, State Farm added to what was required under the 
 
 27 538 U.S. 408 (ruling in favor of State Farm and striking down a $145 million punitive 
damages judgment). 
 28 The Court has not previously dealt with reprehensibility in the context of procedural due 
process review of punitive damages judgments; when the Court discussed reprehensibility 
in Gore and State Farm, it did so in the context of applying substantive due process review 
to punitive damages judgments.  Although substantive and procedural due process review 
of punitive damages verdicts differ in significant ways, I will argue in Part III that applying 
the Court’s conception of reprehensibility as a factor of substantive due process review to 
procedural due process cases is perfectly consistent with the Supreme Court’s punitive 
damages precedent and, similarly, that the Court’s conception of reprehensibility in its 
Philip Morris decision is relevant to future substantive due process cases. 
 29 State Farm, 538 U.S. at 419; Gore, 517 U.S. at 575. 
 30 State Farm, 538 U.S. at 418; Gore, 517 U.S. at 575. 
 31 517 U.S. at 574–85. 
 32 State Farm, 538 U.S. at 418 (citing Gore, 517 U.S. at 575). 
 33 Id. at 419–28; see also Laura J. Hines, Due Process Limitations on Punitive Damages:  Why State 
Farm Won’t Be the Last Word, 37 AKRON L. REV. 779, 789–92 (2004) (explaining that the 
Court in State Farm aimed to provide additional guidance with regards to due process limi-
tations on punitive damages awards). 
  
Feb. 2009] LOSING THE PROCEDURAL BATTLE 735 
 
Gore framework.  For example, State Farm added language suggesting 
that few awards should exceed a single-digit ratio, and the limitation 
on what evidence may be admissible for purposes of determining pu-
nitive damages.34  But in other ways, State Farm merely reiterated the 
standard established in Gore.35  This is particularly true with regard to 
the three guideposts.  The Court in State Farm did not make any sig-
nificant changes to the meaning of the guideposts, and instead just 
reaffirmed the Gore Court’s understanding of the factors.36 
The Supreme Court’s explication of reprehensibility, at least as 
reprehensibility was understood prior to Philip Morris, was most 
clearly stated in State Farm.37  In that case, the Court stated that the 
following considerations are relevant to determining if a defendant’s 
conduct is reprehensible: 
whether[] the harm caused was physical as opposed to economic; the tor-
tious conduct evinced an indifference to or a reckless disregard of the 
health or safety of others; the target of the conduct had financial vulner-
ability; the conduct involved repeated actions or was an isolated incident; 
and the harm was the result of intentional malice, trickery, or deceit, or 
mere accident.38 
All of the factors that the Court found relevant to determining 
reprehensibility relate to the culpability of the defendant or the cal-
lousness of the defendant’s conduct.39  They do not, however, deal 
 
 34 See State Farm, 538 U.S. at 425 (“[I]n practice, few awards exceeding a single-digit ratio 
between punitive and compensatory damages, to a significant degree, will satisfy due 
process.”); id. at 422 (“Lawful out-of-state conduct . . . must have a nexus to the specific 
harm suffered by the plaintiff.  A jury must be instructed, furthermore, that it may not use 
evidence of out-of-state conduct to punish a defendant for action that was lawful in the 
jurisdiction where it occurred.”); see also Laura Clark Fey et al., The Supreme Court Raised Its 
Voice:  Are the Lower Courts Getting the Message?  Punitive Damages Trends After State Farm v. 
Campbell, 56 BAYLOR L. REV. 807, 809–10 (2004). 
 35 See State Farm, 438 U.S. at 418–29 (addressing each Gore guidepost “in some detail” and 
applying them to the facts of State Farm); see also Fey et al., supra note 34, at 858. 
 36 See Fey et al., supra note 34, at 858 (arguing that State Farm “is a landmark opinion be-
cause it set forth new rulings while clarifying and galvanizing the factors in Gore”). 
 37 538 U.S. at 419. 
 38 Id. 
 39 Although two of the five factors—factors one and three—may appear to be relevant to 
reprehensibility based, at least in part, on considerations other than the culpability of the 
defendant or callousness of the defendant’s conduct, I submit that those two considera-
tions were the more likely considerations on which factors one and three were found to 
influence reprehensibility in State Farm. 
   The first factor—whether the harm was physical or economic—could have been 
found to be relevant to reprehensibility based on the effect of the harm caused, not the 
defendant’s culpability in causing the harm.  But it is more likely that the significance of 
this factor is based on the belief that a defendant who causes physical harm often acts 
more callously than a defendant who causes economic harm.  This focus on culpability 
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with the amount of harm caused by the defendant, to either the plain-
tiffs or individuals not party to the litigation.40  This strongly suggests 
that evidence of the amount of harm to non-parties is only relevant to 
reprehensibility if it demonstrates that the defendant acted with a 
heightened level of culpability.  Other language in the Court’s opin-
ions supports this view of reprehensibility.  In State Farm, the Court 
stated that “punitive damages should only be awarded if the defen-
dant’s culpability, after having paid compensatory damages, is so rep-
rehensible as to warrant the imposition of further sanctions.”41  Later 
in the opinion, when the Court discussed how out-of-state conduct 
may be relevant to the reprehensibility analysis, it stated that such 
 
would be consistent with the criminal law’s view that inchoate crimes generally merit the 
same punishment as completed crimes, therefore showing that the harm caused is far less 
significant to the punishment meted out than the culpability of the defendant.  See 
MODEL PENAL CODE § 5.05(1) (2007) (“Except as otherwise provided in this Section, at-
tempt, solicitation and conspiracy are crimes of the same grade and degree as the most 
serious offense that is attempted or solicited or is an object of the conspiracy.”). 
   The third factor—whether the target had financial vulnerability—could have been 
found to be relevant to reprehensibility based on policy considerations regarding the like-
lihood that financially vulnerable victims will require government assistance.  But again, it 
is more likely that the significance of the factor is based on the culpability associated with 
targeting vulnerable victims.  The United States Sentencing Guidelines, which allow for a 
two-level increase if “the defendant knew or should have known that a victim of the of-
fense was a vulnerable victim,” focuses on whether the defendant targeted a vulnerable vic-
tim.  See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 3A1.1(b)(1).  The Guidelines do not al-
low for the increase merely because the victim happened to be vulnerable, even if the 
resulting harm would be the same.  See id. at cmt. 2 (“The adjustment would apply, for 
example, in a fraud case in which the defendant marketed an ineffective cancer cure or 
in a robbery in which the defendant selected a handicapped victim.  But it would not ap-
ply in a case in which the defendant sold fraudulent securities by mail to the general pub-
lic and one of the victims happened to be senile.”). 
 40 Consideration of the amount of harm caused by the defendant is not the same thing as 
consideration of whether the defendant’s conduct involved repeated actions.  The jus-
tices and judges that have begun to apply the Philip Morris conception of reprehensibility 
have done so in cases where an isolated incident caused significant harm.  See Exxon 
Shipping Co. v. Baker, 128 S. Ct. 2605, 2640–41 (2008) (Breyer, J., dissenting) (finding 
that Exxon’s conduct was reprehensible both because Exxon repeatedly allowed a re-
lapsed alcoholic to pilot the vessel, and because the harm caused by the isolated incident 
of the crash easily could have been much worse); S. Union Co. v. Irvin, No. 06-17347, 
2008 WL 4822163, at *5 (9th Cir. Nov. 7, 2008) (Noonan, J., dissenting) (declining to 
dispute the majority’s assertion that damages stemmed from an isolated incident, but 
nonetheless finding that “the conduct . . . posed a substantial risk of harm to the general 
public, and so was particularly reprehensible”). 
   Neither is consideration of harm redundant with the ratio guidepost because harm to 
non-parties, which may be considered for purposes of reprehensibility, may not be con-
sidered in determining the ratio. 
 41 State Farm, 538 U.S. at 419 (emphasis added). 
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“conduct may be probative when it demonstrates the deliberateness and 
culpability of the defendant’s action in the State where it is tortious.”42 
Examination of the five reprehensibility factors, in conjunction 
with the Court’s language when it discusses reprehensibility, makes it 
clear that the reprehensibility analysis under Gore and State Farm was 
meant to focus on the defendant’s culpability (as determined by the 
defendant’s state of mind) and the callousness of the conduct, not 
the ultimate amount of harm caused by the defendant.43  The Court’s 
opinion in Philip Morris appears to change that. 
II.  THE COURT’S CONCEPTION OF REPREHENSIBILITY IN PHILIP MORRIS 
The Supreme Court’s opinion in Philip Morris represents a signifi-
cant shift in the Court’s understanding of the reprehensibility factor.  
In Philip Morris, the Court used language that suggests a broader view 
of reprehensibility than the view described above.  Instead of focusing 
merely on the defendant’s culpability, the Court appears to say that 
the amount of harm caused by the defendant is relevant evidence of re-
prehensibility, above and beyond its usefulness in demonstrating cul-
pability.  Most notably in this regard, the Court states that “conduct 
that risks harm to many is likely more reprehensible than conduct 
that risks harm to only a few.”44  Although this statement could be in-
terpreted in several different ways,45 the interpretation that is the 
most consistent with the rest of the opinion can be rephrased as 
something like the following:  The fact that the conduct causes harm 
to more people necessarily makes the conduct more reprehensible. 
This understanding of the above phrase is consistent with the 
Court’s statement later in the Philip Morris opinion that “[e]vidence 
of actual harm to nonparties can help to show that the conduct that 
harmed the plaintiff also posed a substantial risk of harm to the gen-
eral public, and so was particularly reprehensible.”46  This statement dem-
onstrates that, to the majority in Philip Morris, the fact that conduct 
 
 42 Id. at 422 (emphasis added). 
 43 See also BMW of N. Am., Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 575 n.23 (1996) (“The flagrancy of the 
misconduct is thought to be the primary consideration in determining the amount of 
punitive damages.” (quoting David G. Owen, A Punitive Damages Overview:  Functions, Prob-
lems and Reform, 39 VILL. L. REV. 363, 387 (1994)). 
 44 Philip Morris USA v. Williams, 127 S. Ct. 1057, 1065 (2007). 
 45 This statement does not make clear whether the Court believes that conduct is made 
more reprehensible by the fact that it risks harm to many people, or whether the Court 
just believes that more reprehensible conduct is likely to have a high correlation with 
conduct that risks harm to many people. 
 46 Philip Morris, 127 S. Ct. at 1064 (emphasis added). 
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risks harm to many people makes that conduct more reprehensible.  
The Court finds a direct causal relationship between risk of harm to 
the public and the reprehensibility of the conduct, not just a high 
correlation between the two. 
It is also bolstered by the Court’s explanation earlier in the opin-
ion of what it means for evidence of harm to others to be relevant to 
reprehensibility.  In explaining the relevance of such evidence, the 
Court did not even mention the possibility of utilizing the evidence 
for purposes of showing culpability or a pattern of conduct (two fac-
tors that would have been acceptable under Gore and State Farm),47 
and instead said that “harm to others shows more reprehensible con-
duct.”48  This suggests a much more direct connection between evi-
dence of harm to others and reprehensibility than would exist under 
the view that reprehensibility deals with the defendant’s level of cul-
pability. 
The language used by the Court in the above passages is not the 
only evidence that the Court re-conceptualized reprehensibility in 
Philip Morris.  The change is also apparent in the Court’s application 
of its procedural holding in Philip Morris—that harm to non-parties 
may be considered for reprehensibility purposes only—to the facts of 
the case.  Under the pre-Philip Morris view that reprehensibility is de-
termined by a defendant’s level of culpability, evidence of harm to 
others would still have been relevant to the issue of reprehensibility 
under some circumstances, but only because it might demonstrate 
that the defendant’s conduct was executed with a high level of culpa-
bility, or that the conduct involved repeat action by the defendant.49  
The fact that the conduct caused or risked harm to non-parties would 
not have, in and of itself, made the conduct more reprehensible.  If 
this view of reprehensibility had been applied to the facts of Philip 
Morris, it is quite possible that application of the Court’s procedural 
holding would have required exclusion of the evidence of harm to 
non-parties.50 
 
 47 See State Farm, 538 U.S. at 419; Gore, 517 U.S. at 576–77. 
 48 Philip Morris, 127 S. Ct. at 1064 (emphasis added). 
 49 State Farm was a case in which such evidence may have been relevant to demonstrating 
that the defendant’s conduct was not an isolated incident, but was actually one example 
of a course of conduct.  As such, evidence that other parties were harmed in ways similar 
to the plaintiffs in Gore and State Farm could have been relevant to showing that the de-
fendants acted with a higher level of culpability. 
 50 In contrast to State Farm, the evidence of harm presented in Philip Morris (as well as in 
Gore) was probably unnecessary to demonstrate that Philip Morris’s conduct towards the 
plaintiff was one example of a pattern of conduct.  In addition, the scope of harm caused 
by the conduct was a result more of Philip Morris’s success in the market than repeated 
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But the Court in Philip Morris did not appear to adopt these limits 
on the utility of evidence of harm to others,51 and therefore did not 
even consider the possibility that the amount of harm to non-parties 
caused by Philip Morris might not be relevant to reprehensibility.  
None of the above statements from the Court’s opinion in Philip Mor-
ris cabins the significance of harm to others to demonstrating the de-
fendant’s culpability.  To the contrary, all of these statements strongly 
suggest that a defendant’s conduct is more reprehensible because it 
causes harm to more people. 
Finally, the shift in the Court’s view of what constitutes reprehen-
sible conduct is evident from the lone citation that follows the 
Court’s statement that “conduct that risks harm to many is likely 
more reprehensible than conduct that risks harm to only a few.”52  In 
support of this statement, the Court cites to its decision in Witte v. 
United States,53 a case dealing with the constitutionality under the 
Double Jeopardy Clause54 of additional punishment for recidivists.  
But, even though the Court in Gore and State Farm had also looked to 
the Supreme Court’s recidivism jurisprudence to support its under-
standing of reprehensibility, Witte is an atypical recidivism case that 
takes a much more expansive view of recidivism than what was con-
templated by the Court in Gore and State Farm.  The Court’s reliance 
on Witte provides further support that the Philip Morris Court viewed 
 
acts of fraud.  I would submit that Philip Morris’s conduct would be just as reprehensible 
even if Philip Morris had a significantly smaller market share, and therefore harmed sig-
nificantly fewer people. 
   Similarly, the conduct in Gore involved a policy not to notify purchasers of BMW cars 
if there was damage to the car below a specified amount.  Once the policy was in place, 
the amount of people it harmed was determined by the success of BMW’s marketing and 
sales campaigns.  If BMW’s marketing had been less successful, that would not have 
meant that BMW’s conduct had been any less reprehensible. 
   In both of these cases, a strong argument can be made that evidence of the total 
amount of harm caused by the defendant should have been excluded under Oregon’s 
and Alabama’s Rules of Evidence 403, respectively, because the probative value was sub-
stantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice.  See Klein v. Nat’l R.R. Passenger 
Corp., No. 04-955, 2008 WL 879968, at *21–22 (E.D. Pa. Mar. 31, 2008) (upholding in-
structions very similar to the above theory of reprehensibility). 
 51 But see Thomas B. Colby, Clearing the Smoke from Philip Morris v. Williams:  The Past, Present, 
and Future of Punitive Damages, 118 YALE L.J. (forthcoming 2009) (manuscript at Part IV.e) 
(arguing that the Court’s reprehensibility holding is best understood as adopting this 
type of distinction between when evidence of harm to others may legitimately be used to 
demonstrate reprehensibility and when it may not). 
 52 Philip Morris, 127 S. Ct. at 1065. 
 53 515 U.S. 389 (1995). 
 54 See U.S. CONST. amend. V (“[N]or shall any person be subject for the same offense to be 
twice put in jeopardy of life or limb . . . .”). 
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reprehensibility more expansively than did the Gore and State Farm 
Courts. 
The traditional understanding of recidivism is that, when a defen-
dant continues to violate the law after having been previously pun-
ished, the defendant demonstrates an inability to reform after being 
punished for his conduct.55  This is the version of recidivism that was 
contemplated by the Court in Gore and State Farm.  In Gore, the Court 
mentioned that recidivism is an aspect of reprehensibility, stating that 
“a recidivist may be punished more severely than a first offender [be-
cause] repeated misconduct is more reprehensible than an individual 
instance of malfeasance.”56  The Court then cited to Gryger v. Burke,57 
which upheld a life sentence for a defendant who had been arrested 
eight times, with each arrest leading to either a guilty plea or ver-
dict.58 
In Gryger, the Court held that the Pennsylvania Habitual Criminal 
Act did not retroactively punish the defendant for a conviction that 
took place before the passage of the act because the life sentence “is 
not to be viewed as either a new jeopardy or additional penalty for 
the earlier crimes.”59  The Court justified this result by stating that the 
increased sentence “is a stiffened penalty for the latest crime, which is 
considered to be an aggravated offense because a repetitive one.”60  
Because the Court upheld the increased sentence on the grounds 
that the defendant had previously been convicted on multiple occa-
sions and had not reformed his behavior, it was a fairly standard re-
cidivism case. 
The Court’s reference to recidivism in State Farm was, as in Gore, to 
the traditional understanding of recidivism.  When the Court in State 
Farm discussed recidivism, it merely cited to its decision in Gore for 
the proposition that “repeated misconduct is more reprehensible 
than an individual instance of malfeasance.”61  The Court then fur-
ther limited its understanding of the relevance of recidivism “in the 
 
 55 See, e.g., Rummel v. Estelle, 445 U.S. 263 (1980).  In that case, the Court found that the 
recidivism statute was constitutional because “a recidivist must twice demonstrate that 
conviction and actual imprisonment do not deter him from returning to crime once he is 
released.”  Id. at 278.  As such, the defendant “has been both graphically informed of the 
consequences of lawlessness and given an opportunity to reform, all to no avail.”  Id. 
 56 BMW of N. Am., Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 577 (1996). 
 57 334 U.S. 728 (1948). 
 58 Id. at 730. 
 59 Id. at 732. 
 60 Id. 
 61 State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408, 423 (2003) (quoting Gore, 517 
U.S. at 577). 
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context of civil actions,” stating that “courts must ensure the conduct 
in question replicates the prior transgressions.”62 
But in Philip Morris, the Court did not cite to either Gore or State 
Farm to explain how recidivism can be analogized to punitive dam-
ages.63  Nor did it directly cite to a standard recidivism case like Gry-
ger.64  Instead, the Court cited to Witte, an atypical and more expansive 
recidivism case.65  Witte dealt with the issue of whether the U.S. Sen-
tencing Guidelines Manual violates the constitutional protection 
against double jeopardy when it allows sentencing judges to consider 
“all relevant conduct in which the defendant was engaged and not 
just with regard to the conduct underlying the offense of convic-
tion,”66 in addition to allowing for separate prosecution of the same 
relevant conduct.  In Witte, the defendant, Steven Kurt Witte, had 
been a party to a conspiracy to smuggle into the United States mari-
juana from Mexico and cocaine from Guatemala.67  The conspiracy 
involved two separate attempts to import drugs into the States—one 
in 1990 and another in 1991.68  Unfortunately for the defendant, one 
of his co-conspirators was actually an undercover agent for the Drug 
Enforcement Administration.69 
In 1990, the conspirators attempted to deliver 591 kilograms of 
cocaine from Mexico to the United States.70  But before the drugs 
could be delivered, they were seized in a raid of the Mexican airstrip 
that was being used by Witte’s co-conspirators.71  Although the 1990 
attempt to import cocaine was unsuccessful, Witte was not arrested at 
that time.72 
After a short hiatus, Witte was again approached by the under-
cover agent about participating in the delivery of 1,000 pounds of 
marijuana, and Witte agreed.73  This time, Witte’s luck ran out.  He 
was not able to escape arrest for the second conspiracy and was taken 
into custody when he took possession of the drugs.74 
 
 62 Id. 
 63 See Philip Morris USA v. Williams, 127 S. Ct. 1057, 1065 (2007). 
 64 Id. 
 65 Id. (citing Witte v. United States, 515 U.S. 389, 400 (1995)). 
 66 Witte, 515 U.S. at 393 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 67 Id. at 391. 
 68 Id. at 392. 
 69 Id. at 391. 
 70 Id. at 392. 
 71 Id. 
 72 Id. 
 73 Id. 
 74 Id. 
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When Witte was first indicted for conspiracy and attempting to 
distribute marijuana with intent to distribute, the indictment only 
covered his participation in the attempted delivery of marijuana that 
had been scheduled to take place in 1991.75  The aborted delivery of 
cocaine that took place in 1990 was not part of the indictment.  But 
when it came time to sentence Witte for the 1991 conspiracy, the sen-
tencing judge factored the cocaine from the 1990 conspiracy into his 
consideration under the Sentencing Guidelines, finding that “the 
1990 importation offenses were part of the same continuing conspir-
acy, [and therefore] were ‘relevant conduct’ under . . . the Guide-
lines.”76 
Although Witte did not appeal this sentence, he was later charged 
in a separate indictment for his activities in the 1990 conspiracy, and 
he appealed that conviction up to the Supreme Court on the grounds 
that the conviction violated the Double Jeopardy Clause.77  In review-
ing the case, the Supreme Court found that, although Witte’s sen-
tence for the 1991 conspiracy had been determined by factoring in 
the quantity of drugs he had attempted to smuggle into the United 
States in both 1990 and 1991, his sentence did not constitute “pun-
ishment” for the 1990 conspiracy78 because he was “neither prose-
cuted for nor convicted of the cocaine offenses during the first 
criminal proceeding.”79  As such, subsequent punishment for the 
same conduct would not constitute double jeopardy.80 
Witte is an atypical recidivism case because the conviction for 
which the defendant received an increased penalty was his first con-
viction.  Therefore, he had not demonstrated an inability to reform 
after being punished for his conduct—the standard reason for pun-
ishing recidivists more heavily.81  In comparison to Gryger, where the 
Court looked at the defendant’s capacity for reform after multiple 
convictions—in a sense culpability—the Court in Witte placed more 
emphasis on the total harm caused by the defendant’s conduct, as 
demonstrated by the total amount of drugs the defendant attempted 
 
 75 Id. at 392–93 (“The indictment was limited on its face to conduct occurring on or about 
January 25 through February 8, 1991, thus covering only the later marijuana transac-
tion.”). 
 76 Id. at 394. 
 77 Id. at 394–95. 
 78 Id. at 397 (“[A] defendant . . . is punished, for double jeopardy purposes, only for the 
offense of which the defendant is convicted.”). 
 79 Id. at 396. 
 80 Id. 
 81 See, e.g., supra note 51. 
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to smuggle into the country.  The Court’s reliance on Witte in its Phi-
lip Morris opinion, instead of a more traditional recidivism case, dem-
onstrates an expansion of the way in which the Court finds recidivism 
to be relevant to the reprehensibility analysis.  It shows that the Court 
no longer believes that reprehensibility is based solely on the culpa-
bility of the defendant and the callousness of the defendant’s con-
duct towards the plaintiff—a view of reprehensibility that would be 
supported by cases that find conduct towards others relevant only be-
cause they demonstrate that the defendant is incapable of reform.  
Instead, other factors, such as the potential scope of harm that could 
flow from the defendant’s conduct, are now directly relevant to de-
termining the defendant’s reprehensibility. 
The Court’s citation to Witte, as well as the above-quoted passages 
from the Philip Morris opinion and the way in which the procedural 
holding from Philip Morris was applied to the facts of the case, all 
demonstrate that the Court has broadened its understanding of rep-
rehensibility from the one expressed by the Court in Gore and State 
Farm. 
III.  BEYOND PHILIP MORRIS:  APPLICATION TO SUBSTANTIVE DUE 
PROCESS REVIEW 
Even if the Court’s conception of reprehensibility in Philip Morris 
differs from the conception of reprehensibility put forth in Gore and 
Campbell, the significance of that development would be fairly incon-
sequential if the Philip Morris conception of reprehensibility was lim-
ited to being an evidentiary rule, applicable only to the issue of what 
evidence a jury may legitimately consider when determining whether 
to award punitive damages and, if so, how large the award should be.  
Reprehensibility takes on much more significance as the first of three 
guideposts of a substantive due process challenge than it does as an 
evidentiary rule.  I will argue that, based on Supreme Court prece-
dent, it appears that even though Philip Morris was a procedural due 
process decision, the Court’s conception of reprehensibility should 
be equally applicable to substantive due process challenges to puni-
tive damages judgments. 
The Constitution imposes both substantive and procedural due 
process restraints on punitive damages awards,82 and the restrictions 
imposed by these two forms of due process differ in some significant 
ways.  In the context of punitive damages, substantive due process re-
 
 82 State Farm, 538 U.S. at 416. 
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view is utilized to determine whether a punitive damage award is so 
excessive that it is unconstitutional.83  A violation of substantive due 
process can be found regardless of whether the procedures used to 
determine the amount of the damages award were infirm.84 
In contrast, procedural due process protects the methods by 
which a court reaches its determination of the amount of a damages 
award,85 and can be violated regardless of the amount of damages 
awarded.  Prior to Philip Morris, the Court had been fairly deferential 
to the states when it came to reviewing trial procedures, generally 
upholding even “skeletal jury instructions”86 under a reasonableness 
test,87 although members of the Court have occasionally voiced their 
apprehensions with applying such a lax standard of review.88 
On its face, Philip Morris is a procedural due process case.89  As 
such, it would appear to have limited applicability to future cases de-
cided on substantive due process grounds.  But even though the 
Court refused to address the question of whether the award was so 
excessive as to violate substantive due process,90 and instead only re-
viewed the award for procedural due process infirmities,91 the Court’s 
 
 83 See ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW:  PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES 524 (2d ed. 
2002) (“Substantive due process [in the context of challenges to punitive damages 
awards] prevents excessive punitive damage awards, regardless of the procedures fol-
lowed.”). 
 84 See id. 
 85 See id. (“Procedural due process [in the context of challenges to punitive damages 
awards] requires that there be safeguards such as instructions to the jury to guide their 
discretion, and judicial review to ensure the reasonableness of the awards.”). 
 86 Anthony J. Franze & Sheila B. Scheuerman, Instructing Juries on Punitive Damages:  Due 
Process Revisited After State Farm, 6 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 423, 425 (2004). 
 87 See Pac. Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Haslip, 499 U.S. 1, 18 (1991) (“[G]eneral concerns of rea-
sonableness and adequate guidance from the court when the case is tried to a jury prop-
erly enter into the constitutional calculus.”). 
 88 See, e.g., State Farm, 538 U.S. at 417 (“Jury instructions typically leave the jury with wide 
discretion in choosing amounts, and the presentation of evidence of a defendant’s net 
worth creates the potential that juries will use their verdicts to express biases against big 
businesses . . . .”); Haslip, 499 U.S. at 42–64 (O’Connor, J., dissenting) (“Regrettably, 
common-law procedures for awarding punitive damages [have a devastating potential for 
harm].  States routinely authorize civil juries to impose punitive damages without provid-
ing them any meaningful instructions on how to do so.”). 
 89 See Philip Morris, 127 S. Ct. at 1063 (“Because we shall not decide whether the award here 
at issue is ‘grossly excessive,’ we need now only consider the Constitution’s procedural 
limitations.”).  But see id. at 1067 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (“[T]he ‘procedural’ rule is 
simply a confusing implementation of the substantive due process regime this Court has 
created for punitive damages.”). 
 90 Philip Morris, 127 S. Ct. at 1065 (majority opinion) (“[W]e shall not consider whether the 
award is constitutionally ‘grossly excessive.’”). 
 91 Id. at 1063 (“Because we shall not decide whether the award here at issue is ‘grossly exces-
sive,’ we need now only consider the Constitution’s procedural limitations.”). 
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opinion may nonetheless demonstrate a significant shift in the 
Court’s understanding of the substantive due process analysis and, 
therefore, affect the way such analysis is undertaken in the future. 
This is because the Supreme Court’s punitive damages precedents 
have created a strong interrelation between the applicable law in 
procedural and substantive due process cases.92  In the Court’s more 
recent punitive damages cases, the distinction between post-verdict 
substantive due process review of punitive damages awards and pre-
verdict procedural due process requirements has often been far from 
clear.  Starting with State Farm, the Court began to contemplate the 
relationship between substantive and procedural due process and has 
found them to be interrelated in many ways.93  Based on that interre-
lation, the Court in State Farm found that procedural limitations were 
a relevant consideration for substantive due process review.94  The 
Court’s opinion in Philip Morris recognizes the same relationship, al-
though it represents the opposite of State Farm, basing its procedural 
due process holding on the substantive due process holdings in State 
Farm and Gore.95  When the Court in Philip Morris contemplated 
whether a jury could directly punish for potential harm to non-
parties, the Court looked to State Farm (a substantive due process de-
cision) and found that judges could only consider potential harm to 
the plaintiff, and not to other parties.96  The Court did not try to dis-
tinguish between consideration at trial by a jury and post-verdict re-
view by a judge, nor did it put any reservations on the analogy be-
tween these two aspects of a case.97 
Because of the way punitive damages law has developed through 
recent Supreme Court opinions, with concepts from substantive and 
procedural due process cases intermixing whenever a concept is rele-
vant to both areas, there seems to be little reason to believe that rep-
 
 92 See Franze & Scheuerman, supra note 86, at 511 (explaining that the “Court’s punitive 
damages decisions repeatedly have blended the concepts of substantive and procedural 
due process”). 
 93 See Sheila B. Scheuerman & Anthony J. Franze, Instructing Juries on Punitive Damages:  Due 
Process Revisited After Philip Morris v. Williams, 10 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 1147, 1149 (2008) 
(“[I]n State Farm, the Court for the first time stated that a jury must be instructed on one 
of the substantive, post-verdict limits recognized by the Court.”). 
 94 See State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408, 418 (2003) (“Our [substan-
tive due process] concerns are heightened when the decisionmaker is presented . . . with 
evidence that has little bearing as to the amount of punitive damages that should be 
awarded.”). 
 95 See Philip Morris, 127 S. Ct. at 1063. 
 96 Id. 
 97 See id. 
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rehensibility should be an exception.  Just as the Court looked to the 
post-verdict guideposts when it was asked to decide what a jury could 
validly consider,98 it would be perfectly consistent with its precedents 
for the Court to look to what aspects of reprehensibility a jury may 
consider when utilizing reprehensibility as a guidepost for substantive 
due process review.99  Some courts have already cited language from 
Philip Morris regarding reprehensibility when discussing the repre-
hensibility guidepost of a substantive due process challenge,100 and 
there is no reason to believe that this trend will not continue. 
So how will the post-Philip Morris conception of reprehensibility af-
fect future mass-tort plaintiffs?  Before I answer that question, it is 
necessary to understand how lower courts have applied the reprehen-
sibility guidepost when reviewing punitive damages judgments.  De-
spite the Supreme Court’s language stating that reprehensibility is 
the most important factor to consider when determining whether 
punitive damages violate substantive due process, the lower courts 
have generally utilized the reprehensibility guidepost as merely a sec-
ondary consideration, far inferior to the second guidepost—the ratio 
between a punitive damages award and the actual or potential harm 
to the plaintiff. 
The way the guideposts have been utilized by lower courts is ex-
emplified by two state supreme court cases:  Goddard v. Farmers Insur-
 
 98 See id. (looking at questions such as the number of victims, as well as the seriousness and 
circumstances of the injury). 
 99 In fact, it is more likely that concepts from procedural due process will be relevant to sub-
stantive due process than vice versa, because there may be considerations that a judge is 
allowed to take into account even though a jury is forbidden to do so. 
100 See Action Marine, Inc. v. Cont’l Carbon Inc., 481 F.3d 1302, 1318–20, 1323 (11th Cir. 
2007) (finding punitive damages judgment did not violate substantive due process in part 
because plaintiff’s “actions likely harmed a great number of people and businesses who 
are not parties to this litigation,” making its conduct “exceedingly reprehensible”); Lea-
vey v. Unum Provident Corp., Nos. 06-16285, 06-16350, 2008 WL 4472937 (9th Cir. Oct. 6, 
2008) (upholding the lower court’s reduction of a punitive damage award on substantive 
due process grounds in part because there was “scant evidence of repeated misconduct of 
the sort that injured [the plaintiff]” (quoting State Farm, 538 U.S. at 423)); Cook v. Rock-
well Int’l Corp., 564 F. Supp. 2d 1189, 1211 (D. Colo. 2008) (adding “whether the con-
duct risked harm to many as opposed to a few” to the list of factors relevant to reprehen-
sibility); cf. Loudermilk Servs., Inc. v. Marathon Petroleum Co., No. 3:04-0966, 2008 WL 
4181379 (S.D. W. Va. Sept. 5, 2008) (intermingling a discussion of reprehensibility for 
purposes of substantive due process review with a discussion of the constitutionality under 
procedural due process of a multiplier to determine punitive damages for each member 
of a class).  But see Morris v. Flaig, 511 F. Supp. 2d 282, 310 n.20 (E.D.N.Y. 2007) (finding 
Philip Morris inapplicable to a substantive due process challenge to a punitive damages 
award). 
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ance Co. of Oregon,101 recently decided by the Oregon Supreme Court, 
and Simon v. San Paolo U.S. Holding Co.,102 decided by the California 
Supreme Court.  In both cases, the courts used the first guidepost as a 
supplement to the second guidepost, and not as an independent de-
terminate of whether an award was reasonable. 
In Goddard, the Oregon Supreme Court first considered whether 
the reprehensibility guidepost, on its own, would be helpful in de-
termining the reasonableness of an award,103 and found that it would 
not be.104  The court stated that “the first guidepost, reprehensibility, 
does not generate numerical answers at all, because the guidepost it-
self, and the ‘subfactors’ that go into it, are all qualitative, not quanti-
tative.”105  Because reprehensibility deals with qualitative factors, it 
could only be used as a tool for comparing punitive damage verdicts 
with each other.106  Similarly, the court found that “[t]he third guide-
post, which examines comparable sanctions, also fails to provide a 
quantitative measuring stick.”107  Although the dollar amount of any 
comparable sanction is a quantitative measurement, the court found 
that the Supreme Court had not used it as a quantitative measure.  
Instead, the court found that, based on the Supreme Court’s applica-
tion of the third guidepost in State Farm, the dollar amount is to “be 
used as a basis for comparing one punitive damages award to an-
other, and not as a direct predictor of the constitutional limits of an 
individual punitive damages award.”108 
Therefore, even though the Supreme Court has stated that repre-
hensibility is the first and “most important” guidepost,109 the Oregon 
Supreme Court began its analysis with the second guidepost—the ra-
tio between punitive damages and actual or potential harm to the 
plaintiff.110  It found that this guidepost “comes closest to providing 
numerical limits” on the amount of punitive damages that should be 
 
101 179 P.3d 645 (Or. 2008). 
102 113 P.3d 63 (Cal. 2005). 
103 Goddard, 179 P.3d at 660 (“It is clear that analysis must begin, at least, with 
the . . . guideposts from Gore and Campbell.”). 
104 Id. 
105 Id. 
106 Id. (“[W]e may compare the level of reprehensibility exhibited in various cases, and that 
comparison may lead us to a conclusion that the constitutionally permissible limit in a 
particular case is ‘high’ or ‘low,’ relative to the limit in another case.”). 
107 Id. 
108 Id. 
109 BMW of N. Am., Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 575 (1996). 
110 Goddard, 179 P.3d at 660. 
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found to be constitutionally permissible.111  Although the second gui-
depost is “far from perfect” as a measure of constitutionality,112 the 
court found that it “does provide at least a rough numerical baseline 
 
111 Id. 
112 Id. at 661.  Aside from the questions of how the ratio is grounded in the Constitution, see 
Anthony J. Sebok, Punitive Damages:  From Myth to Theory, 92 IOWA L. REV. 957, 1029 (2007) 
(arguing that the words in State Farm dealing with the constitutionality of a single-digit 
multiplier “are some of the most regrettable ever written about punitive damages.  The 
ratio rule the Supreme Court embraced lacks any principled foundation, and it does not 
even have the virtue of being an arbitrary rule chosen by the legislature”), and what ratio 
represents the constitutional limit in any particular case, a lot of confusion surrounding 
the second guidepost stems from the question of what “potential harm” may be consid-
ered in determining the second number in the punitive damages ratio.  See, e.g., Willow 
Inn, Inc. v. Pub. Serv. Mut. Ins. Co., 399 F.3d 224, 234 (3d Cir. 2005) (finding “no short-
age of candidates” for the second number in the ratio); In re Exxon Valdez, 270 F.3d 
1215, 1243 (9th Cir. 2001) (finding the second number in the ratio to be “arguable” and 
“somewhat indeterminate”); see also John A. Albers, Comment, State of Confusion:  Substan-
tive and Procedural Due Process with Regard to Punitive Damages After TXO Production Corp. 
v. Alliance Resources Corp., 26 U. TOL. L. REV. 159, 193–94, n.262 (1994); Jenny Miao Ji-
ang, Comment, Whimsical Punishment:  The Vice of Federal Intervention, Constitutionalization, 
and Substantive Due Process in Punitive Damages Law, 94 CAL. L. REV. 793, 798 (2006). 
   Courts have generally limited the scope of the inquiry to potential harm that would 
be likely to happen, see TXO Prod. Corp. v. Alliance Res. Corp., 509 U.S. 443, 460 (1993) 
(opinion of Stevens, J.) (“Punitive damages should bear a reasonable relationship to the 
harm that is likely to occur from the defendant’s conduct as well as to the harm that actually has 
occurred.”), but even that leaves multiple questions unanswered.  Prior to Philip Morris, it 
was unclear whether the potential harm relevant to the second guidepost was only poten-
tial harm to the plaintiff, or if it included potential harm to non-parties.  Compare State 
Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408, 424 (2003) (“[W]e 
have been reluctant to identify concrete constitutional limits on the ratio between harm, 
or potential harm, to the plaintiff and the punitive damages award.” (emphasis added)), 
and TXO, 509 U.S. at 462 (“While petitioner stresses the shocking disparity between the 
punitive award and the compensatory award, that shock dissipates when one considers 
the potential loss to respondents, in terms of reduced or eliminated royalties payments, had 
petitioner succeeded in its illicit scheme.” (emphasis added)), with TXO, 509 U.S. at 460 
(“It is appropriate to consider the magnitude of the potential harm that the defendant’s 
conduct would have caused to its intended victim if the wrongful plan had succeeded, as well 
as the possible harm to other victims that might have resulted if similar future behavior were 
not deterred.” (second and third emphases added)), and Dean v. Olibas, 129 F.3d 1001, 
1007 (8th Cir. 1997) (considering potential harm to future victims when determining the 
ratio).  But Philip Morris appears to have answered this question.  127 S. Ct. at 1063 
(“[W]e have made clear that the potential harm at issue was harm potentially caused the 
plaintiff.”).  It remains unclear whether potential harm includes potential harm that 
would have been caused by future similar conduct, or only harm that potentially could 
have resulted from conduct that transpired.  Compare Pulla v. Amoco Oil Co., 72 F.3d 648, 
659 (8th Cir. 1995) (“[A] court may not justify the award of punitive damages in a par-
ticular case by overlooking the actual events and focusing on potential victims of similar 
hypothetical torts.”), with Dean, 129 F.3d at 1007 (“[Harm that might have resulted] includes 
‘the possible harm to other victims that might have resulted if similar future behavior 
were not deterred.’” (quoting TXO, 509 U.S. at 460)). 
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for calculating a maximum constitutionally permissible punitive 
damages award in a given case.”113 
The reprehensibility guidepost (as well as the third guidepost 
dealing with comparable sanctions) then comes into play once a ratio 
of punitive damages to actual or potential harm to the plaintiff has 
been determined.114  Even then, the court only utilizes it in a subsidi-
ary role to the second guidepost.  The court stated that the first gui-
depost can be used to justify a ratio that is on the high end of what 
the Supreme Court has previously found would be acceptable, 
namely a 9-to-1 ratio.115  Only in extraordinary cases, such as when 
conduct is particularly reprehensible, will a court be justified in up-
holding a punitive damages award that exceeds a single-digit ratio.116 
The Supreme Court of California has applied the guideposts in a 
very similar manner to the way the Oregon Supreme Court used 
them in Goddard.  In Simon v. San Paolo U.S. Holding Co.,117 the court 
interpreted the Gore/State Farm guideposts as creating “a type of pre-
sumption” against punitive damage awards greater than a 9- or 10-to-1 
ratio,118 but a presumption that could be overcome by a “special justi-
fication.”119  And the first justification listed by the court was “extreme 
reprehensibility.”120  This language demonstrates that, like the Ore-
gon Supreme Court, the California Supreme Court used the repre-
hensibility guidepost as a subsidiary factor to the ratio in the second 
guidepost.  An extremely high level of reprehensibility can be used to 
justify a higher ratio, but it is insufficient on its own to justify a par-
ticular punitive damages award because it does not have a quantita-
tive element. 
Based on the way the lower courts have applied the three guide-
posts to cases, the reprehensibility guidepost actually has a fairly lim-
ited effect on the amount of punitive damages that will be allowed in 
a particular case, at least when compared to the significance of the 
 
113 Goddard, 179 P.3d at 661. 
114 Id. (“Once that rough numerical reference point is established, the other guideposts 
come into play.”). 
115 Id. (“[P]unitive damages at what normally is the highest constitutionally permissible level 
(i.e., a nine-to-one ratio between punitive and compensatory damages) are justified only 
when the conduct at issue is highly reprehensible . . . .”). 
116 Id. at 667 (“It may be true that . . . a punitive damages award that exceeds the single-digit 
ratio may be acceptable in a few narrow circumstances . . . [, such as] when ‘extraordinar-
ily reprehensible’ conduct . . . is involved.”). 
117 113 P.3d 63 (Cal. 2005). 
118 Id. at 77. 
119 Id. 
120 Id. 
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second guidepost.  When a defendant is particularly reprehensible, 
the court will consider allowing a ratio that exceeds a single-digit 
multiplier.  But courts are hesitant to significantly exceed such a mul-
tiplier, regardless of how reprehensible the defendant’s conduct 
was.121 
This does not mean that courts have never upheld punitive dam-
ages verdicts where the ratio of actual or potential damages to puni-
tive damages far exceeded the 10-to-1 ratio.  One prominent example 
of a lower court upholding a large ratio between actual (or potential) 
damages and punitive damages to a substantive due process challenge 
is, of course, the Oregon Supreme Court’s opinion in Philip Morris.122  
But the Oregon Supreme Court in Philip Morris was only able to jus-
tify such a large ratio by applying the guideposts in a way that was fun-
damentally different from how the same court had applied them in 
Goddard and how the California Supreme Court had applied them in 
Simon—a way that allowed the evidence of harm to non-parties to take 
on substantially more significance. 
When the Oregon Supreme Court first considered the Philip Mor-
ris case, the court found that the $79.5 million punitive damages 
judgment did not violate substantive due process even though the ac-
tual damages did not exceed $800,000123—a ratio of almost 100:1!  In 
order to reach such a conclusion, the Oregon Supreme Court did not 
 
121 See, e.g., Bocci v. Key Pharm., Inc., 76 P.3d 669, 675 (Or. Ct. App. 2003) (finding that, al-
though the defendant’s conduct was highly reprehensible, it did not “rise to the level of 
‘particularly egregious,’ intentionally malicious acts” justifying a ratio exceeding single 
digits), modified and adhered to on reconsideration, 79 P.3d 908 (2003); Bardis v. Oates, 14 
Cal. Rptr. 3d 89, 105 (Cal. Ct. App. 2004) (finding that a 42-to-1 ratio “cannot stand 
unless extraordinary factors are present”).  But see Swinton v. Potomac Corp., 270 F.3d 
794, 818–19 (9th Cir. 2001) (upholding a 28-to-1 ratio for “particularly egregious” acts of 
ongoing racial harassment that resulted in low actual damages). 
122 See Williams v. Philip Morris Inc. (Philip Morris V), 127 P.3d 1165, 1182 (Or. 2006), rev’d 
sub nom. on other grounds, Philip Morris USA v. Williams, 127 S. Ct. 1057 (2007).  The Su-
preme Court reversed the Oregon Supreme Court’s decision, but on remand, the Ore-
gon Supreme Court again upheld the punitive damages verdict on state procedural 
grounds, without addressing the substantive due process issue.  See Williams v. Philip Mor-
ris Inc. (Philip Morris VII), 176 P.3d 1255 (Or. 2008).  Certiorari was granted “limited to 
Question 1 presented by the petition.”  Philip Morris USA Inc. v. Williams, 128 S. Ct. 2904 
(2008).  The Court will answer “[w]hether, after this Court has adjudicated the merits of 
a party’s federal claim and remanded the case to state court with instructions to ‘apply’ 
the correct constitutional standard, the state court may interpose—for the first time in 
the litigation—a state-law procedural bar that is neither firmly established nor regularly 
followed,” but declined to review Question 2, which sought clarification of the appropri-
ate application of the relationship between punitive and compensatory damages.  Peti-
tion, supra note 13, at *i. 
123 Philip Morris V, 127 P.3d at 1181–82. 
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find that the 100:1 ratio was reasonable given the reprehensibility.  In 
fact, the court expressly stated that, regardless of which figure they 
used to represent the actual damages,124 “the second Gore guidepost is 
not met.”125  But even though the ratio seemed to suggest that the 
punitive damages award was unconstitutional, the court upheld it on 
substantive due process grounds by ignoring the ratio altogether.126  
The court found that “[o]f the three Gore guideposts, then, two sup-
port a very significant punitive damage award.  One guidepost—the 
ratio—cuts the other way.”127  And because the first and third guide-
post pointed towards “a very significant punitive damage award,” the 
fact that the second guidepost suggested the award was unconstitu-
tional was outweighed. 
This method of applying the guideposts for purposes of substan-
tive due process review is seriously flawed.  As other lower courts that 
have attempted to apply the guideposts have pointed out, the second 
guidepost—the ratio—is the only guidepost that provides a “quantita-
tive measuring stick.”128  As such, the court’s finding that a $79.5 mil-
lion punitive damages award is constitutional does not appear to be 
tethered to any quantitative measure.  Because the approach utilized 
by the Oregon Supreme Court in Philip Morris to review the award for 
a violation of substantive due process does not provide a quantitative 
method for assessing constitutionality, it is a far inferior utilization of 
the Gore guideposts than the method utilized by the Goddard and 
Simon courts, and implicitly utilized in numerous other cases. 
If the post-Philip Morris conception of reprehensibility is applied to 
the substantive due process framework described above, courts will be 
able to uphold large punitive damages awards against corporate mass-
tort defendants that they would have been unable to uphold under 
the Gore/State Farm rubric.  Whereas the culpability understanding of 
reprehensibility ignored the total amount of harm caused by the de-
fendants actions and focused solely on the defendant’s culpability 
and the callousness of the defendant’s conduct, the Philip Morris in-
terpretation of reprehensibility would make corporate defendants, 
whose conduct is more likely to cause widespread harm than that of 
 
124 Id. at 1181 (declining to decide whether the appropriate figure to use for the actual dam-
ages portion of the ratio was the $800,000 awarded by the jury or the $500,000 awarded 
by the trial court after applying a statutory cap to the award). 
125 Id. 
126 Id. 
127 Id. 
128 Goddard v. Farmers Ins. Co. of Or., 179 P.3d 645, 660 (Or. 2008) (noting that the second 
guidepost comes closest to providing numerical limits). 
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individual defendants,129 more susceptible to judicial findings of high 
reprehensibility.130  If courts are able to find that a defendant’s con-
duct is highly reprehensible based, either entirely or in part, on the 
total scope of the harm caused by defendant’s conduct (not on the 
level of culpability associated with the conduct), then it is likely that 
corporate conduct will be deemed highly reprehensible with greater 
frequency, leaving corporate defendants more susceptible to punitive 
damages verdicts approaching or exceeding the 10-to-1 ratio that has 
generally marked the outer boundary of constitutionality.131  Defen-
dants will no longer have to prove that a corporate defendant acted 
with a high level of culpability to sustain a high punitive damages 
verdict so long as the conduct that caused the defendant’s harm also 
caused widespread harm.132 
CONCLUSION 
If courts reviewing punitive damages verdicts for violation of sub-
stantive due process adopt the broader view of reprehensibility sug-
gested by Philip Morris, that result would be a victory for plaintiffs 
seeking to obtain punitive damages verdicts from corporate defen-
dants in mass-tort cases.  Although the procedural holding of Philip 
 
129 See Susan P. Koniak, How Like a Winter?  The Plight of Absent Class Members Denied Adequate 
Representation, 79 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1787, 1800 (2004) (“Corporations, by and large the 
defendants in [class actions], . . . affect the real world—with their power . . . to do devas-
tating and widespread harm.”). 
130 Compare Exxon Shipping Co. v. Baker, 128 S. Ct. 2605, 2621–22 (2008) (applying a 1:1 
ratio to reduce a $2.5 billion punitive damages award because the defendant’s conduct 
ranked on the low end of the blameworthiness scale), with id. at 2640–41 (Breyer, J., dis-
senting) (voting to uphold the punitive damages award based on his agreement with the 
district court and the Ninth Circuit that the defendant’s conduct was “highly reprehensi-
ble” and “egregious”).  Justice Breyer’s view that Exxon’s conduct was “highly reprehensi-
ble” is particularly enlightening because he authored the majority opinion in Philip Mor-
ris. 
131 See supra notes 114–20 and accompanying text. 
132 A recent decision by the Ninth Circuit shows how application of the Philip Morris repre-
hensibility holding to substantive due process challenges could potentially benefit plain-
tiffs.  In Southern Union Co. v. Irvin, a majority of the panel applied the State Farm repre-
hensibility factors and found that a punitive damages verdict ten times larger than 
compensatory damages violated substantive due process, and remanded with an offer of 
remittitur three times compensatory damages.  See No. 06-17347, 2008 WL 4822163, at 
*1–2 (9th Cir. Nov. 7, 2008).  In contrast, Judge Noonan in dissent found that the puni-
tive damages judgment did not violate substantive due process.  Although Judge Noonan 
did not dispute the majorities analysis of the State Farm factors, citing Philip Morris, he 
found that the plaintiff’s “exploitation of high public office” was “particularly reprehensi-
ble” because it “posed a substantial risk of harm to the general public.”  Id. at *5 (Noo-
nan, J., dissenting) (quoting Philip Morris USA v. Williams, 127 S. Ct. 1057, 1064 (2007)). 
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Morris prevents plaintiffs from arguing for “total harm” damages—
punitive damages that punish the defendant for all of the harm they 
cause, including harm to non-parties—which may make it more diffi-
cult to persuade juries to award large punitive damages judgments, 
plaintiffs who receive large punitive damages awards may now find it 
easier to argue that the awards should survive substantive due process 
review.  Based on the Court’s re-conceptualization of reprehensibility, 
a punitive damages verdict at or near the 10-to-1 ratio—generally 
considered to be the maximum allowable ratio under State Farm ab-
sent special circumstances—could now be sustained even if the de-
fendant’s culpability was not particularly egregious, so long as the 
conduct that harmed the defendant also caused significant and wide-
spread harm to others.  Plaintiffs who suffer mass-tort harm at the 
hands of corporate defendants may have lost the procedural battle in 
Philip Morris, but if future courts apply the broader conception of 
reprehensibility adopted in Philip Morris to substantive due process 
review, plaintiffs may find that the more significant effect of the case 
derives from their victory in the substantive war. 

